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Abstract
This paper analyzes how population aging aﬀects immigration pol-
icy in rich industrialized countries. It sets up a two-period model of
a representative democracy with two overlapping generations. The
government’s preferred immigration rate increases with the share of
retirees in the population. The paper diﬀerentiates between an econ-
omy without a pension system and one with pay-as-you-go pensions.
As immigrants have more children than natives, the chosen immigra-
tion rate is contingent on the design of the pension system. If pension
contributions and beneﬁts are set freely by the government, equilib-
rium immigration is lower than it is in the absence of a pension system.
On the contrary, it is higher if the pension level is ﬁxed ex ante to a
relatively generous level, since native workers then beneﬁt from shar-
ing the burden of pension contributions with the immigrants.
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Virtually all industrialized countries are facing a decline in birth rates and an
increase in life expectancy resulting in substantial population aging. Against
this background, the question arises how rich countries adjust their immigra-
tion policies in the wake of demographic change. For instance, the United
Nations’ report on replacement migration (UNDP 2001) investigates how
much immigration would be necessary to oﬀset population aging in various
low-fertility countries. Apparently, the supply of potential migrants is not
a limiting factor for international labor ﬂows, see e.g. Facchini and Mayda
(2008) who make restrictive immigration policies responsible for low observed
international labor ﬂows.
This paper sets up a political economy model of a representative democ-
racy to answer the question whether the demand for immigrants is higher in
countries with an older population. It accounts for the fact that immigrants
in industrialized countries tend to have more children than natives, altering
the political balance in subsequent periods. Furthermore, the paper distin-
guishes between diﬀerent possible pension system characteristics. While the
benchmark model abstracts from public pensions, the model extensions in
section 4 contrast a pension system with ﬁxed beneﬁts to one with fully
ﬂexible beneﬁts and contributions.
Point of departure is a two-period economy with two overlapping genera-
tions, young workers and old retirees. In each period the respective govern-
ment sets the immigration level to maximize political support from its voters,
i.e. from both currently living generations. The electorate is heterogeneous
since workers and retirees have conﬂicting preferences concerning the number
of immigrants. Due to its eﬀects on factor accumulation, immigration policy
in the ﬁrst period not only inﬂuences the welfare of current generations but
it also has consequences for welfare in the second period. Immigration policy
is, therefore, a sequential game between the governments of the subsequent
periods. The equilibrium of this game is derived to analyze how the popu-
lation growth rate inﬂuences the level of immigration. The bottom line of
the analysis is that in a representative democracy an increase in the share of
old individuals in the electorate enhances immigration. This result holds re-
gardless of whether old individuals have a pension income ﬁnanced by young
individuals’ contributions or only an income from private savings.
In the present model, preferences concerning immigration are driven both
by the impact of immigration on factor prices and on the pay-as-you-go
(PAYG) pension system, and by non-economic factors subsumed in a “disu-
tility” parameter. The income eﬀects induced by immigration in the host
country have been analyzed under a variety of assumptions, see e.g. Razin
1and Sadka (2000, 2004), Epstein and Hillman (2003), and Kemnitz (2003).
In theory, immigration alters factor prices by increasing labor supply (wages
decline while returns to capital increase). If the labor market is not fully
ﬂexible, unemployment may increase instead, as in Kemnitz (2003). These
eﬀects are dampened if capital is mobile internationally, or if production
structures adjust as predicted by the Rybczynski theorem, see e.g. Hillman
and Weiss (1999). Despite capital mobility and trade migration seems to have
an impact on incomes: Whereas Card (1990) ﬁnds that the Mariel boatlift of
1980, a worker inﬂow of 7% of the Miami labor force, had virtually no eﬀect
on wages and unemployment rates there, there is evidence for negative wage
eﬀects at the national level, see e.g. Borjas (2003). Furthermore, Angrist
and Kugler (2003), using European panel data from 1983 to 1999, ﬁnd that
in Europe, immigration displaced natives, and that unemployment eﬀects
were more negative in countries with less ﬂexible labor markets. Meanwhile,
non-economic factors clearly shape attitudes towards immigration, see for
instance O’Rourke and Sinnott (2006) and Mayda (2006).
This model builds on several related papers with endogenous immigra-
tion policy. Benhabib (1996) examines immigration policy in a median
voter model with heterogeneous wealth endowments, whereas Mazza and van
Winden (1996) analyze the determination of redistribution and immigration
policies in a representative democracy with workers and capital owners. In
both models, individuals are in favor of admitting immigrants if these are
diﬀerent from themselves. In the dynamic models by Dolmas and Huﬀman
(2004) and Ortega (2005) preferences are mitigated or even reversed as im-
migrants get to vote on redistribution policy in the future. Natives may then
favor the admission of immigrants who are similar to themselves. This ef-
fect is counteracted in the present model by the high number of immigrants’
oﬀspring, who will oppose high pension beneﬁts in the future.
Scholten and Thum (1996) and Haupt and Peters (1998) analyze im-
migration policy in the presence of (exogenous) PAYG pensions in median
voter models with three generations. Immigration policy is determined by
the old workers’ preferences in their settings. More closely related to this
analysis is a relatively recent paper by Sand and Razin (2007). They ana-
lyze equilibrium immigration and pension policy making in a dynamic set-up
with two overlapping generations. In their median-voter framework, popu-
lation aging may lead to a switch from the young voters’ preferred policies
to an implementation of the old voters’ preferred policies, namely maximum
immigration and a tax rate which maximizes social security revenue. Fol-
lowing Hillman and Weiss (1999), the present approach chooses a political
support function, which includes all groups of voters, to model a representa-
tive democracy, rather than a median voter model. In contrast to Sand and
2Razin (2007), the predicted consequences of aging are less drastic. Instead,
the relationship between population growth and the equilibrium immigration
level is continuous.1
The economic model is set up in section 2 and immigration policy is
analyzed in section 3. Section 4 adds a social security system to the model.
Section 5 concludes.
2 The Economic Model
The economic framework is a two-period version of an overlapping-generations
model with workers and retirees. A two-period model is suﬃcient to show
the key eﬀects of immigration on both generations’ utility levels while it is
relatively straightforward to solve: Individuals know that the world ends af-
ter two periods and there is a closed-form solution for the equilibrium in the
second period, which can be used to derive the equilibrium in the ﬁrst period.
In each period t = 1,2 competitive ﬁrms produce a single aggregate good






Young individuals supply one unit of labor. The workforce Lt is composed
of natives and immigrants such that Lt = Nt(1 + γt), where γt is the ratio
of immigrants per native worker (as in Sand and Razin 2007). The capital
stock Kt is given by the old individuals’ savings. For simplicity capital is
assumed to depreciate completely after one period. The capital stock per
worker (native or immigrant) is deﬁned as kt ≡ Kt/Lt and the capital stock
per native worker as ˜ kt ≡ Kt/Nt, therefore kt = ˜ kt/(1 + γt). International
trade or capital mobility which might result in world factor price equalization
are ignored. For a given capital stock per native worker, immigration thus
lowers the capital intensity in production and thereby wages, whereas capital
returns increase. Equilibrium factor prices are then given by
wt = (1 − α)˜ k
α
t (1 + γt)
−α and 1 + rt = α˜ k
α−1
t (1 + γt)
1−α . (1)
In each period, young individuals receive a wage income wt. The young
generation born in the ﬁrst period allocates the wage income to consumption
and savings. The young generation born in the second period only lives for
that period and therefore consumes its entire wage income. Old individuals
are retired and consume all of their wealth st−1 (1 + rt). In the benchmark
1Note that in an overlapping-generations model with many generations, aging would
not lead to drastic changes in the median voter’s preferred policy either.
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t − dγt , t = 1,2 .
The term dγt denotes a disutility related to immigration or to the integration
of immigrants, which is not accounted for in incomes and does not aﬀect in-
dividuals’ consumption decision. For instance, an increased heterogeneity of
social norms and customs may reduce utility as in Hillman (2002) and Krieger
(2005). Additionally, the parameter d may capture a reduction in the util-
ity derived from public goods which results from heterogeneous preferences
(see Alesina and La Ferrara 2005). The young in period 1 also anticipate
the disutility dγ2 related to immigration in period 2. Optimal savings and














w1 (1 + r2) . (2)
Immigration is permanent and the children of immigrants are considered
as natives, such that N2 = (1 + n)N1 + (1 + m)γ1N1, where n is the native
rate of population growth and m the immigrant rate of population growth.
Deﬁning the diﬀerence between the population growth rates of immigrants
and natives as δ = m − n, the number of workers in period 2 is N2 =
[(1 + n)(1 + γ1) + δγ1]N1. In line with empirical evidence on immigration to
industrialized countries, only the case δ ≥ 0 is considered. Immigrants are
fully integrated into the economy after one period and are allowed to vote in
their old age.
The capital market is in equilibrium if K2 = s1L1. The capital endowment
of each native worker in the second period is given by
˜ k2 =
β(1 − α)˜ kα
1(1 + γ1)1−α
(1 + β)[(1 + n)(1 + γ1) + δγ1]
, (3)
since ˜ k2 = s1 (1 + γ1)N1/N2. According to (3), immigration lowers capital








(1 + n)(1 + γ1) + δγ1
+ α
￿
< 0 . (4)
The reason for this result is that both wage income and thereby individual
savings, and the ratio of savers to next period’s native workers decline with
immigration.
43 Immigration Policy in the Benchmark Model
The political economy equilibrium is derived under the assumption of a rep-
resentative democracy in which the government accounts for the welfare of
both contemporaneously living generations when setting immigration policy.
More precisely, in each period t = 1,2 the government sets γt to maximize













t denote the indirect utility of a representative old and
young individual, respectively, while ωo
t and ω
y
t denote their political weights.
This objective function is more suitable for replicating policy outcomes in a
representative democracy than the median voter’s utility, as Hillman and
Weiss (1999) argue. It can be motivated by a probabilistic voting framework
as in Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) and Coughlin et al. (1990). It is assumed
that both generations are equally responsive to policy changes, such that the





(2 + n)(1 + γt−1) + δγt−1
and ω
y
t = 1 − ω
o
t .
The sequence of events is as follows: at the beginning of each period, the
respective government decides on immigration policy. Production takes place
after immigration, and ﬁnally young individuals decide how to allocate their
wage income to consumption and savings. It is straightforward to solve the
model by backward induction. Therefore, equilibrium immigration policy in
the second period is discussed ﬁrst. The second-period immigration rate is
then used to derive the ﬁrst-period equilibrium. While a closed-form solution
for γ2 exists, this is not the case for γ1. However, it is possible to identify the
diﬀerent channels through which ﬁrst-period immigration aﬀects the young
and old generations and to solve numerically for the equilibrium.
Immigration Policy in the Second Period
In the second period, the young prefer not to admit any immigrants because
of the induced decline in the wage and because of the disutility related to
immigration, dγ2. The old would like to admit immigrants up to the point
where the marginal increase in the capital return is equal to the marginal
2Relaxing this assumption would allow for the inﬂuence of interest groups as in Facchini
and Mayda (2008).




























− d = 0 ,
follows the policy rule





Equilibrium immigration is contingent on past immigration but not on
the state variable ˜ k2. The policy rule in (6) has a number of properties which
are worth discussing because they also apply to the ﬁrst period: A positive
number of immigrants is admitted (γ2 > 0) as long as d < ωo
2−α, i.e., the non-
income disutility of integrating immigrants has to be suﬃciently small. Since
only the old generation favors admitting a positive number of immigrants,
the second-period immigration rate rises with the old’s population share (and
declines with their share in aggregate income). The population share is
contingent on the native population growth rate, on the previous period’s
immigration rate and on the diﬀerence in population growth rates between
natives and immigrants.
A high native population growth rate n implies that the political weight
of the old generation is low. Population aging – a decline in the population









The immigration rate in the ﬁrst period alters the age composition of the
electorate in the second period as long as immigrants have more children than
natives: The second-period population share of the old generation declines as










(1 + γ1)2 ≤ 0 iﬀ δ ≥ 0 . (7)
The second-period immigration rate is also a declining function of δ (for given
γ1 > 0) since a higher number of children among the immigrants from the









≤ 0 iﬀ γ1 ≥ 0 .
6In summary, the government’s preferred immigration rate in the second
period clearly increases as the young generation’s share in the electorate de-
clines. However, the immigration rates in both periods are substitutes. A
high ﬁrst-period immigration rate thus counteracts the eﬀect of population
aging on the second-period immigration rate. The eﬀects of ﬁrst-period im-
migration on both generations and the ﬁrst-period government’s preferred
immigration rate will be discussed now.
Immigration Policy in the First Period
The ﬁrst-period government accounts for the impact of its immigration pol-
icy decision on factor accumulation and on the immigration rate set by the
second-period government. In the ﬁrst period, the old generation’s marginal
utility from immigration is the same as in the second period, dV o
1 /dγ1 =
(1 − α)/(1 + γ1) − d. However, the young generation’s marginal utility is































While the declining wage lowers consumption in young and old age, immi-
gration also has some second-order eﬀects on the future capital return (via
its impact on capital accumulation and on the future age composition of the
electorate). Furthermore, since the immigration rates in both periods are
substitutes, admitting more immigrants in the ﬁrst period lowers the disutil-
ity related to immigration in the second period, which can be seen from the























with dγ2/dγ1 < 0 given by (7) and d˜ k2/dγ1 < 0 given by (4).































(1 + γ1)2 = 0 ,
(11)
where the population shares reduce to ωo
1 = 1/(2+n) and ω
y
1 = (1+n)/(2+n),
since there is no past immigration. This equation is highly non-linear in the
immigration rate γ1 and therefore cannot be expressed analytically in closed
form. Note, however, that γ1 does not depend on the state variable ˜ k1 either,
but only on the model parameters. The impact of the parameters determining
the demographic structure of the population is of primary interest, i.e. the
impact of the native population growth rate n and of the diﬀerence between
the immigrant and the native population growth rate δ.
While in the second period a lower population growth rate n enhances
immigration by increasing the old generation’s share in the electorate, it has
some additional (contrasting) eﬀects on the equilibrium immigration rate in
the ﬁrst period. First, as argued in section 2, immigration reduces the future
ratio of capital to native workers, implying a higher future capital return, be-
cause of lower wages and because of a lower number of savers relative to the
number of next-period natives. Both of these eﬀects are enhanced by a low
population growth rate, weakening the opposition of the young generation
to immigration. Second, the dampening eﬀect of ﬁrst-period immigration
on second-period immigration is larger the lower is the native population’s
growth rate. This has two opposing eﬀects on preferences over the level of
ﬁrst-period immigration. A lower γ2 due to a higher γ1 directly increases
the young generation’s lifetime utility, also weakening the young’s opposi-
tion to immigration as n declines. However, the second-period capital return
is reduced, enhancing opposition to immigration. In summary, a lower pop-
ulation growth rate induces several expanding eﬀects on immigration policy,
but also a contracting eﬀect, since the increase in the future return on savings
is dampened.
Contrary to the second period, the diﬀerence in population growth rates
between immigrants and natives δ does not inﬂuence the political weights of
the two generations in the ﬁrst period, since there is no past immigration.3
However, δ alters the impact of the ﬁrst-period immigration rate on the
second-period immigration rate γ2 and on second-period capital per native
3This simpliﬁcation would not apply in a setting with a longer time-horizon.
8˜ k2. It can be shown that δ has contrasting eﬀects on both derivatives. On the
one hand, ﬁrst-period immigration has a stronger negative impact on second-
period immigration the larger the reduction in the old generation’s future
political weight ωo
2. As mentioned above, this weight declines as immigrants
have more children than natives. On the other hand, there is also a level
eﬀect: the impact of γ1 on γ2 is weaker the smaller ωo
2. Similarly, γ1 has
a stronger negative impact on ˜ k2 the larger δ. This is because the ratio
of savers to next-period natives declines with the diﬀerence in population
growth rates between immigrants and natives. However, there is also a level
eﬀect: the impact of γ1 on ˜ k2 is weaker the smaller is ˜ k2, which is the case
for a large diﬀerence in population growth rates. Intuitively, the government
admits many immigrants if there is a strong negative impact of immigration
on capital immigration, since this implies higher capital returns in the second
period.
If immigrants have the same number of children as natives, immigra-
tion policy does not have any impact on the future age composition of the
electorate and the nonlinear terms vanish. For this special case (δ = 0),
immigration policy is determined by the time-invariant rule
1 + γ1 =
(1 − α) − (1 + n)α(1 + αβ)
(2 + n)d
.
The derivative of the immigration rate with respect to the population growth
rate can then analytically be shown to be negative. For δ > 0, however,
numerical simulations are necessary to ﬁnd a solution for γ1 and to investigate
the impact of n and δ.
Before discussing the simulation results the choice of parameter values is
now motivated. This investigation largely follows B¨ orsch-Supan et al. (2003)
in deﬁning the diﬀerent parameter values. Population parameters are taken
from the United Nations’ Population Division Database (UNPD 2006). The
production share of capital α is set to 0.35. According to B¨ orsch-Supan et al.
(2003) a common assumption for the annual discount rate of households is
0.01. If it is assumed that each of the two life periods lasts for 30 years,4
this corresponds to a discount factor β of about 0.75. The benchmark native
population growth rate is n = −0.2, which is computed from the 2000-2005
average number of children per woman for the world’s more developed re-
gions. The diﬀerence between the immigrant and native population growth
rates δ is set to 0.5, the diﬀerence between the less developed regions (ex-
cluding the least developed regions) and the more developed regions. The
non-economic disutility parameter related to the integration of immigrants,
4An increase in life expectancy is not modeled.
9d, is set to 0.1. This is, of course, somewhat arbitrary; however, this pa-
rameter has a direct and unambiguous impact on equilibrium immigration.
Therefore, the eﬀect of picking a diﬀerent value for d is quite clear.
Figure 1 illustrates the simulation results. Population aging visibly in-
creases the government’s preferred immigration rate γ1. Bear in mind that
this attenuates the positive eﬀect of population aging on second-period im-
migration since the immigration rates in both periods are substitutes. The
aggregate eﬀect of the population growth rate on the second-period immi-













With ∂γ1/∂n < 0, the positive eﬀect of population aging on the second-period
immigration rate is at least attenuated by a higher ﬁrst-period immigration
rate. The simulations reveal that the aggregate eﬀect of aging on the im-
migration rate in the second period is positive for low population growth
rates but negative for population growth rates close to zero. Meanwhile, the
overall eﬀect of the diﬀerence between the native and the immigrant popula-
tion growth rate is ambiguous. Figure 1(b) shows more clearly that δ has a
non-monotonic eﬀect on γ1. Similar to an increase in the native population
growth rate, an increase in the diﬀerence between population growth rates
lowers immigration, given that this diﬀerence is already high. However, the
opposite is true for a low diﬀerence δ. The conclusions which can be drawn
from the simulations are outlined in proposition 1.
Proposition 1 In a representative democracy without a social security sys-
tem,
(i) a lower native population growth rate has a direct positive eﬀect on the
equilibrium immigration rate. However, the immigration rates in the two pe-
riods are substitutes.
(ii) the diﬀerence between the native and the immigrant population growth
rate has a non-monotonic eﬀect on the equilibrium immigration rate. The
immigration rate increases for low diﬀerences in population growth rates but
decreases for high diﬀerences.
Summarizing, immigration inﬂuences voters’ welfare in two ways, by al-
tering factor prices and by causing a non-income disutility. Population aging
leads to a higher level of immigration in the ﬁrst period since immigration in-
creases the return on the old generation’s accumulated capital. If immigrants
have more children than natives, ﬁrst-period immigration raises the share of





















(a) Impact of n and δ






















(b) Impact of δ for given n
Figure 1: Impact of n and δ on First-Period Immigration
11both periods are substitutes. The following section turns to the question of
whether the existence of a social security system changes these results.
4 Social Security
Since aging implies a higher old-age dependency ratio, immigration is often
seen as a (partial) solution to ﬁnancing problems of social security, in par-
ticular of PAYG pension systems. Therefore, a pension system is introduced
into the model to investigate the relationship between immigration and social
security. Net wages are wt(1 − τt), where τt is the contribution rate to the





with bt as the level of individual pension beneﬁts.
































Note that the impact of immigration on capital accumulation, determined
by ˜ k2 = s1 (1 + γ1)N1/N2, is ambiguous. Although the ratio of workers to
next period’s native workers (1 + γ1)N1/N2 declines with immigration, the
net wage may not. Furthermore, per capita savings increase with a declining
discounted value of future pension beneﬁts.
Equilibrium immigration policy with PAYG pensions is analyzed in two
diﬀerent settings. In the ﬁrst setting, pensioners receive a ﬂat beneﬁt bt = b,
whereas in the second setting, the government can freely set the social secu-
rity contribution rate τt in each period.5 Even though the government cannot
freely set pension contributions in the ﬁrst setting, these are endogenously
determined by its choice of the immigration rate.
5The same results would hold if the government was assumed to set bt instead of τt.
12Flat Beneﬁt
In the case of a ﬂat beneﬁt, the government sets immigration policy γt to
maximize (3), taking into account that individuals allocate consumption ac-
cording to (12). Individuals’ marginal utility in the second period is not the


























for the old and young generation respectively, where
c
o
2 = s1(1 + r2) + b and c
y
2 = w2(1 − τ2) .
In this setting, immigration has no eﬀect on the old generation’s social
security beneﬁts. The old’s utility gain due to increasing capital returns is
smaller the smaller the share of private savings in the old’s total consumption
– the larger social security beneﬁts. Although the young experience a utility
loss due to declining wages, they beneﬁt from a declining social security
contribution rate. For τ2 > α, the young’s marginal economic utility from
raising immigration is actually positive. Even if τ2 ≤ α, the old’s and young’s
preferences in the presence of PAYG pensions are closer together than in the
benchmark model.


















− d = 0 ,
the government’s preferred immigration rate can be computed numerically.
Again, population aging increases the share of individuals who clearly favor
immigration. Additionally, aging now boosts the positive eﬀect of immigra-
tion on the young’s utility because a lower native population growth rate
implies higher pension contributions. Note that the equilibrium immigra-
tion rate is now contingent on the old’s and young’s consumptions levels,
and therefore on the state variable ˜ k2. The results for the second period are
not discussed separately, but the ﬁrst-order condition of the second-period
government is used for the simulations of the full model with social security.
In the ﬁrst period, immigration aﬀects the old in the same way as in the
second period: dV o
1 /dγ1 = (1 − α)/(1 + γ1) · s0(1 + r1)/co
1 − d. The old’s
beneﬁt from increasing capital returns is smaller the smaller the share of
private savings in their consumption. Meanwhile the young’s welfare is also
13aﬀected by the impact of ﬁrst-period on second-period immigration and by










































2 are given by (12).




w1 (α − τ1)
1 + γ1
,
may be positive or negative, as in the second period. Furthermore, immi-
gration in the ﬁrst period aﬀects second-period capital returns via capital
accumulation and via the second-period immigration rate, as in (10).
Raising immigration raises the future share of young voters, which sug-
gests a negative derivative dγ2/dγ1, conﬁrmed by the simulations. The im-
pact of immigration on capital accumulation is contingent on r2 and therefore




























Although the net wage may increase with immigration, the decreasing ratio
of savers to second-period natives and the increasing value of discounted
second-period beneﬁts cause a dampening eﬀect of γ1 on ˜ k2, also conﬁrmed
by the simulations.
Figure 2 illustrates that, in the ﬁrst period as well, both generations’
conﬂict of interest concerning immigration is less pronounced than in the ab-
sence of a pension system. Given a native population growth rate of n = −0.2
and a diﬀerence between the immigrant and the native population growth
rate of δ = 0.5, ﬁgures 2(a) and 2(b) show both generations’ utility levels
as functions of ﬁrst-period immigration, for diﬀerent degrees of generosity of
the pension system.6 One can see from the ﬁgures that the old’s utility gain
6Only beneﬁt levels below the level of the wage income (in the absence of immigration),
w1|γ1=0 = 0.37 are considered. The capital stock per native worker and immigration in
the second period are computed endogenously.















(a) Impact of γ1 on V
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(b) Impact of γ1 on V o
1
Figure 2: Impact of Immigration on Welfare
15from increasing capital returns is smaller the larger pension beneﬁts, while
the young’s utility loss from a decreasing gross wage is mitigated or even
reversed by decreasing pension contributions. For sizable levels of social se-
curity beneﬁts, the young thus also prefer positive levels of immigration over
no immigration.
To derive the level of immigration in the ﬁrst period, the following La-























The government in the ﬁrst period thus maximizes aggregate welfare in the
ﬁrst period subject to the ﬁrst-order condition in the second period and
subject to the capital accumulation condition. To ﬁnd the equilibrium of the



















It is relatively straightforward to compute these derivatives numerically.
Figure 3 shows the simulated equilibrium values for ﬁrst-period immi-
gration γ1 as a function of the level of individual pension beneﬁts b. The
solid line in ﬁgures 3(a) and 3(b) is based on the benchmark parameter val-
ues n = −0.2 and δ = 0.5. The ﬁgures illustrate that an initially positive
preferred immigration rate is reduced by the introduction of pensions. This
is due to the old generation’s decreased utility gain, as private savings ac-
count for a smaller share of their income. While immigration still entails a
non-income disutility, its eﬀectivity as a device for income redistribution is
reduced. However, the government’s preferred immigration rate increases as
pensions increase further, because the young generation beneﬁts from shar-
ing the burden of pension contributions with the immigrants. While ﬁgure
3(a) shows the relationship between b and γ1 for various levels of the native
population growth rate, ﬁgure 3(b) shows a smaller detail of this relation-
ship for various levels of the diﬀerence in population growth rates. As in
the case without a social security system, population aging clearly enhances
immigration, while the impact of diﬀerences in the number of children is
ambiguous.
The conclusion is:
Proposition 2 Given a PAYG pension system with exogenous beneﬁts b
(i) the level of pension beneﬁts has a non-monotonic eﬀect on equilibrium im-
migration. The government’s preferred immigration rate decreases for small













(a) Diﬀerent levels of n













(b) Diﬀerent levels of δ
Figure 3: Impact of Social Security on First-Period Immigration
17levels of b, but increases above the immigration rate in the absence of PAYG
pensions for high levels of b.
(ii) a lower native population growth rate has a positive eﬀect on the equilib-
rium immigration rate.
(iii) the diﬀerence between the native and the immigrant population growth
rate has an ambiguous eﬀect on the immigration rate.
Notice that in this setting the old’s pension beneﬁts are not contingent
on the level of the young’s wages. This is diﬀerent if the government can
freely set both the current immigration rate γt and the current social security
contribution rate τt. That setting is discussed next.
Fully Flexible Contributions and Beneﬁts
The government now maximizes its objective function (3) with respect to γt
and to τt. Even though substantial pension reforms in the last decade have
met with a lot of opposition, it seems plausible to assume that industrial-
ized countries’ governments are able to change the parameters of the social
security system over time. In many industrialized countries, the level of pen-
sion beneﬁts is at least partly tied to wages. Actual PAYG pension systems
should therefore be located between the two extreme settings discussed here.
Second period consumption levels are co
2 = s1(1+r2)+b2 and c
y
2 = w2(1−
τ2), where b2 = τ2w2(1 + l2) and τ2 is set by the government. Immigration
negatively aﬀects the young generation since the gross wage declines. It has
several eﬀects on the old generation’s welfare: on the one hand immigration
raises the capital return and also the number of contributors to social security.
On the other hand, the declining gross wage reduces social security beneﬁts,
ceteris paribus. The net eﬀect of higher immigration on the old generation’s
















just as in the case without social security. Although the income change from
immigration is proportional to consumption and thus higher for the old and
lower for the young with a social security system in place, the marginal utility
of income is accordingly lower for the old and higher for the young. The
additional eﬀects of immigration induced by the existence of a social security
system exactly cancel out and consequently, the chosen level of immigration
in the second period is given by (6).
Regarding social security contributions, the old and young generations’
preferences are unambiguous. While the old favor high beneﬁts, the young
18would prefer not to pay any social security contributions. From the govern-







Equilibrium social security contributions increase in the population share of
the old generation. Although the social security contribution rate in the sec-
ond period is independent from second-period immigration, it is contingent
on ﬁrst-period immigration since ﬁrst-period immigration reduces the share
of old voters in the second period.
In the ﬁrst period, the old generation’s marginal utility corresponds to
the one in the second period and thus does not diﬀer from the case without
a pension system. However, the young generation’s marginal utility does not








































with dw1/dγ1 and dr2/dγ1 still given by equations (9) and (10), where dγ2/dγ1
< 0, still given by (7). The key diﬀerence is that immigration in the ﬁrst










2 < 0 .
Lower future pension contributions ceteris paribus imply lower beneﬁts and
a negative eﬀect on the young generation’s utility. This suggests that the
government’s chosen immigration rate will be lower than in the absence of a
pension system. Furthermore, lower future beneﬁts enhance capital accumu-
lation since individuals have to provide for their old age consumption.

































7See Lorz (1999) and more recently Gonzales-Eiras and Niepelt (2007) who derive
similar results in models without immigration.
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 < 0 ,
(19)
and therefore a positive (partial) eﬀect on capital accumulation. The simula-
tions show that the aggregate eﬀect on capital accumulation is still negative.
Meanwhile, the eﬀect on undiscounted beneﬁts is ambiguous: even though
the contribution rate and the number of future immigrant contributors de-
cline, the future ratio of native contributors to pension recipients increases.
Furthermore, the impact of immigration on the future wage rate is ambigu-




























with d˜ k2/dγ1 deﬁned by equations (18) and (19). The ﬁrst term in (20) is the
eﬀect on the future ratio of native contributors to pension recipients, while
the last term is the eﬀect on the future share of old voters, which determines
both γ2 and τ2.
The simulations of the model conﬁrm that the equilibrium immigration
rate in the presence of fully ﬂexible pension contributions and beneﬁts is
lower than in the absence of a pension system, see ﬁgure 4. Figure 4(a)
shows the relationship between the ﬁrst-period immigration rate and the
native population growth rate in the presence and in the absence of social
security, given δ = 0.5. Figure 4(b) shows the relationship between the ﬁrst-
period immigration rate and the diﬀerence in population growth rates given
n = −0.2.
Since the old generation unambiguously beneﬁts from immigration, pop-
ulation aging still boosts immigration, as ﬁgure 4(a) shows. The diﬀerence
between the native and the immigrant population growth rate still has a
non-monotonic eﬀect, see ﬁgure 4(b). Note that if immigrants have the same
number of children as natives (δ = 0), the existence of a PAYG pension
system does not aﬀect immigration. This result is due to the fact that ﬁrst-
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Figure 4: First-Period Immigration With and Without a Pension System
21period immigration then does not have any impact on the second-period pen-
sion contribution rate τ2. The ﬁndings of the model with a pension system
with fully ﬂexible parameters are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Given a PAYG pension system with fully ﬂexible beneﬁts and
contributions
(i) the equilibrium immigration rate is lower than in the absence of a pension
system.
(ii) a lower native population growth rate has a positive eﬀect on the equilib-
rium immigration rate.
(iii) the diﬀerence between the native and the immigrant population growth
rate has a non-monotonic eﬀect on the equilibrium immigration rate.
Recall that in the presence of exogenous old-age pensions ﬁnanced by the
young generation the equilibrium immigration rate may well be higher than
in the absence of a pension system. However, the immigration rate is lower if
the government can freely decide on both the volume of immigration and the
generosity of the pension system. If the pension beneﬁt is exogenous, young
individuals beneﬁt from sharing the burden of pension contributions with
immigrants. This eﬀect is absent when the burden of pension contributions
is endogenous. However, then, immigration generates a negative externality
for the young generation as long as immigrants have more children than na-
tives: the larger future cohort of young individuals will induce lower pension
contributions and ceteris paribus lower beneﬁts.
5 Conclusion
This paper has analyzed the eﬀects of population aging on immigration policy
in a two-period economy with two overlapping generations. A representative
democracy was modeled by assuming that in each period the respective gov-
ernment limits immigration to the level that maximizes aggregate welfare of
its voters. Immigration preferences are driven by economic as well as non-
economic motives: immigration alters factor prices and additionally causes
a disutility not related to individual incomes. Population aging implies that
the old generation receives a higher political weight in the government’s ob-
jective function. Aging has an expansionary eﬀect on the chosen immigration
level, due to the fact that immigration increases the return on the old gener-
ation’s savings. However, since immigrants have more children than natives,
a high immigration rate in the ﬁrst period is tantamount to a large share of
young voters, and therefore low immigration, in the second period.
22In the presence of a PAYG pension system, immigration additionally af-
fects the level of pension contributions and/or beneﬁts. Population aging still
unambiguously enhances immigration but the predictions concerning the ef-
fect of pensions on immigration policy are contingent on how the pension
system is modeled. The paper contrasts a system with ﬁxed beneﬁts to one
with fully ﬂexible contributions and beneﬁts. With exogenous pension bene-
ﬁts, the young and old generations’ preferences are closer together than in the
absence of a pension system: whereas the old’s utility gain from immigration
decreases with a decreasing share of private savings in their consumption,
the young’s net wage may even increase with immigration since individual
pension contributions decline. For high beneﬁt levels, equilibrium immigra-
tion is higher than in the absence of a pension system, while the reverse is
true for low beneﬁt levels. Contrary to this, the chosen immigration rate is
lower than in the absence of pensions when the government can freely set
contributions: the government anticipates that immigration will reduce its
young voters’ future pensions beneﬁts. As immigrants have more children
than natives, the future old’s population share declines with immigration.
In the benchmark model presented in this paper, positive levels of im-
migration are driven solely by old individuals’ preferences for high capital
returns. If pension beneﬁts are ﬁxed, native young workers also beneﬁt from
sharing the burden of pension contributions with immigrant workers. Fur-
ther insights can be expected from introducing diﬀerent skill levels into the
model. Skilled native workers may support the immigration of low skilled
workers and vice versa. Furthermore, as the The World Bank (2009) outlines,
the agglomeration of skilled labor may entail beneﬁts because of increasing
returns to scale and external eﬀects such as welfare spillovers as in Facchini
and Mayda (2008).
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